With the regime toppled, it's easier to gain some perspective on which dire scenarios and claims about what Iraq would do panned out and why (or why not). Here's a brief guide, starting with the bad stuff:

What Saddam Did

More Terrorism in Iraq. I don't think there's any more denying that Saddam's was very much the terrorist regime we had always believed. Saddam's Iraq in the final days became a magnet for terrorists looking to fight jihad, and the same type of ~~human scum~~ Arab fighters who flocked to Afghanistan made their way to Iraq. Fortuitously, this gave us the chance to smoke them out and kill them, making it every bit a part of the War on Terror. In the mop-up to follow, expect to see even more of these dead-enders meet their demise, depriving Al Qaeda (or whatever's left of it) of its best recruits.

Ultimately, the suicide bombings only demonstrated the true nature of who we were dealing with. That they weren't more systematic was a question of competence, not will. There should be have been no doubt about the regime's willingness, under less trying circumstances, to pass weapons and resources to terrorists.

"Fierce Resistance." OK, it wasn't so fierce after all. But it is interesting that most of the fedayeen seemed to be concentrated in Nasiriyia and Basra, which just happened to be the two cities you'd have to cross first on the way to Baghdad. Rather than "draw us in" to Baghdad, the strategy seemed to be trip us up on the frontlines. It won the regime some propaganda points at first, but at a very, very high cost.

Iraqi Targeting of Civilians. Another unfortunate aspect of the fedayeen-style resistance was the terrorization of the civilian population. When all is said and done, it is likely that more Iraqis will have been killed by their own forces than by the coalition, including many in Herold's otherwise fictitious "body count." The "anarchy" that's now such a concern was probably nothing in comparison to the chaos inflicted by the fedayeen dragging civilians into the battlefield.

The Arab Street inflamed... but to what end? While not something Saddam "did" per se (and frankly, I'm stretching to find threats he actually made good on), the irrationalism and paranoia of the Arab Street continued apace, with weeping and catcalls accompanying the fall of the Saddam statue, even sans Stars and Stripes. Ultimately, there can be no reasoning, at least in the short term, with populations who clearly think the Mossad was involved in 9/11 and that Saddam would fight valiantly against the infidels. The long, sober reckoning — the drying-out from the intoxicating hatred of Israel and America — will take years and will not be won with short-term victories on the battlefield. Our goal must be to continuing stripping away the illusions of this dream world they inhabit.

And ordinary Iraqis need to be reminded that the rest of the Arab world literally abandoned them in the time of their greatest need.

What Saddam Didn't Do

No Use of WMD. Obviously, this is a big one that needs explaining. I think this could have been due to a variety of factors, and ultimately boils down to this: Saddam didn't use all of his conventional arms; because of this, his non-use of his most sophisticated and difficult-to-deploy weaponry probably shouldn't surprise us. The underlying reasons for this are many. The arms could have been so well-hidden (a boon during the inspections process) that they could have been difficult to access in war, particularly for disconnected commanders with little or no autonomy of their own. Already our forces are finding tempting signs of these weapons, and an enemy that was clearly prepared for their use. Iraqi commanders could have also heeded our warnings of severe consequences for anyone ordering their use; our psywar operations to pacify the regular Iraqi army were actually pretty successful — more successful than at least I thought they'd be. Finally, even the Iraqis could have realized that the arms would be battlefield-ineffective and would kill more of theirs than ours. The Iraqis had chemical weapons in Kuwait, and didn't use them. Counting on Iraqi commanders to behave rationally is a dubious proposition, but one perhaps that we can't discount entirely.

Virtually No Burning Oil Wells. This one even mystifies me, and probably reinforces the theory that utter breakdown in command-and-control prevented the Iraqis from taking even basic and obvious steps to wreak havoc on the coalition. Particularly vexing is why they didn't torch the northern oil fields, which weren't secured until recently. If the regime couldn't even light a few fires in areas they indisputably controlled, how could they have successfully deployed weapons of mass destruction?

No Terrorist Attacks Here in the U.S. Although there's no way to know for sure, this probably shows better than anything else could how far we've come in breaking the organizational backbone of Al Qaeda. A competing theory, one not entirely incompatible with the first, is that they've never even planned to attack in times when we've expected it. This is belied somewhat by the heightened activity surrounding the first anniversary of 9/11, but confirmed by 9/11 itself, something that had been planned for years, and wasn't timed to coincide with any geopolitical event.

No Attacks on Israel. This one (also) gets filed in the "dumb and dumber" category used to explain why many other dogs didn't bark in this war. An outside explanation for this might be that this time there wasn't as much to be gained from attacking Israel as in 1991. Unlike 1991, big-time Arab governments weren't directly involved in the war, and Arab publics were already 99% for Saddam. Going after Israel might have been desirable from Saddam's standpoint, but a lower priority than it was twelve years ago.

No Turkish Invasion of Kurdish Territory. Not connected to Saddam, but still a welcome nondevelopment. Ironically, the most overtly anti-Saddam area of the country is the last to see nearby territory formally liberated, perhaps serving to cool tensions.

This is just the big stuff. There's a lot more I'm missing. The bottom line is that things could have turned out a lot worse. Delivering the knockout punch early on is what saved the day.