The midterm motivation gap
Very liberal Dems hopped up on politics, who swung in Virginia, opposition to the Iran War on the right, the tragic twenties, the class divide in AI
No. 399 | April 24, 2026
🇺🇲 Trump’s strongest soldiers lag run-of-the-mill Democrats in midterm motivation
We’ve been tracking motivation in the midterms for quite some time, and this month Kristen broke the numbers down by MAGA vs. non-MAGA Republicans.
MAGA Republicans are more motivated to vote, but even they lag all Democrats and leaners by 9 points in being extremely motivated to vote in the midterms.
We asked a similar question to more directly isolate the Trump factor in the midterms — getting an even wider spread. This question specifically focused on their party winning control of Congress to either stop or help Trump’s agenda. All Democrats were 16 points more extremely motivated than MAGA Republicans. Non-MAGA Republicans were 35 points less extremely motivated than Democrats.
Along similar lines, the most liberal Democrats are much likelier than the most conservative Republicans to consider politics extremely important to their personal identity. The majority of Americans not at the ideological extremes are nowhere to be found on this measure.
Among very liberal white Democrats, the number is even higher: 49 percent.
🗺️ Democrats go up in the redistricting war
Democrats narrowly got their map 10-1 in Virginia, pending a court challenge. But the vote by the new Congressional district was not 10-1, but more likely 9-2 — with an additional 2 districts very close.
The shifts among different demographic groups line up very close to what we saw in the 2025 election. Most places swung against the measure, especially rural areas most affected by the new maps. But once again, the nonwhite Trump 2024 voter didn’t show up in big numbers.
I’ll also re-up this chart from my post on Wednesday, showing the unexpectedly close result was a function of stronger Republican turnout—better even than 2024 and possibly 2021. The implication is that there was little net persuasion in the referendum and that the closeness of the result came down to Republicans being given a real reason to vote. That wasn’t enough in Virginia, but could hold lessons for the midterms.
🪖 Opposition to the war in Iran comes not from MAGA but new Trump 2024 voters
Earlier this year, More in Common released their typology of the Trump 2024 voter, breaking them down into four groups. Like others, they found opposition to the war coming not from within MAGA itself, but what they term the “Reluctant Right” more loosely attached to the Republican Party. While 22% of Trump voters overall oppose the war, 54% the Reluctant Right do.
😞 “The tragic twenties”
Derek Thompson has a piece you should read very much in line with what I wrote a few weeks ago on America’s new era of discontent.
Most measures of satisfaction are plummeting, and that includes personal happiness, right direction/wrong track, economic sentiment, and Presidential approval.
He finds a culprit: the pandemic that never really ended. And I buy that, given that the crappy polling about the economy stuck around even after the economy bounced back.
🤖 The growing class divide in AI
80% of US adults who report using Claude in the previous week live in households earning $100,000 or more a year, while just 37% of users of Meta AI do. That reflects a growing segmentation of the AI marketplace not unlike the blue bubble/green bubble divide of iOS and Android.
